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Introduction 
 
 
Fresh Impetus for West African 
Drug Policy 
Opportunities for New Partnerships in the Wake of UNGASS 
Judith Vorrath 
Almost two decades after the proclamation of the goal of a “drug-free world”, the glo-
bal illicit drug trade is flourishing. The markets and routes, however, are constantly 
changing, confronting countries and regions with an array of new challenges. West 
African countries in particular are no longer merely transit zones for cocaine or heroin. 
Yet they played virtually no role in the preparations for the Special Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) in late April 
2016. Nonetheless, the UNGASS process has injected fresh momentum into the drug 
policy debate within the region. This offers starting points for new partnerships, 
particularly with Europe, since various West African countries and organizations have 
moved closer to the EU’s comparatively progressive drug policy position. For genuine 
change, however, there needs to be not only a shift away from the still predominantly 
repressive approaches applied by national governments in West Africa, but also a 
rethink of European security sector programmes. 
 
In the past 10 years, the drug problem 
in West Africa has mainly captured inter-
national attention due to the increased 
trafficking of South American cocaine 
through the region on the way to Europe. 
Although the quantities seized in West 
Africa have decreased since peaking in 2007, 
the estimated market value was still USD 
1.25 billion in 2013. And as the West Africa 
Commission on Drugs pointed out in its 
2014 report, the problem is not confined to 
the transit of cocaine. The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also 
states that the trade is now more firmly 
rooted in the region itself and that con-
sumption of hard drugs is increasing, 
although reliable figures are rarely avail-
able. Alongside the widespread cultivation 
of cannabis and, according to estimates, the 
above-average levels of consumption of this 
drug in the region compared with the rest 
of the world, there are indications that 
in some West African countries, metham-
phetamine is increasingly being produced 
for the Asian market. Furthermore, in some 
places a strong protection economy for 
drug kingpins has emerged, allowing them 
to operate to a large extent with impunity. 
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The Special Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on the World Drug Prob-
lem (UNGASS) on 19–21 April 2016 there-
fore provided an opportunity for, inter alia, 
a review of the region’s policies. 
A breath of fresh air in the region’s 
drug policy debate 
The UN General Assembly’s review of inter-
national drug policy, initially scheduled 
only for 2019, was based on an initiative 
by Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. The 
African countries played a fairly minor role 
in this process. Granted, the African Union 
produced a Common African Position 
(CAP) for UNGASS, which advocates for a 
balanced and integrated approach, with 
a stronger focus on public health issues in 
drug policy. However, this position barely 
featured in the negotiations on the draft of 
the UNGASS outcome document conducted 
by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 
Vienna, largely because very few African 
countries are represented there. Indeed, 
South Africa presented a far more restrictive 
and, in many respects, inconsistent posi-
tion on behalf of the Africa Group. 
On the face of it, the situation in West 
Africa seems to be similarly entrenched. 
Most strategies for managing the drug 
problem are repressive and heavy-handed, 
relying primarily on criminal justice, with 
consequences that are all too familiar. 
Besides having negative impacts on health, 
this approach overstretches already weak 
justice systems without effectively combat-
ing organized crime. That was one of the 
reasons why, in 2014, the WACD called 
for a focus on prevention, public health, 
decriminalization of drug possession for 
personal use, and a reform and harmoniza-
tion of the region’s drug laws on the basis 
of minimum standards. 
In fact, the preparations for UNGASS 
2016 in West Africa have created some im-
petus in this direction. In January 2016, 
representatives of governments, national 
law enforcement agencies and civil society 
from 11 West African countries met for a 
two-day workshop in Accra, where they 
adopted a Communiqué on a West African 
Common Position towards UNGASS. Al-
though not an official document, it sets 
out a clear commitment to harm reduction 
programmes, including facilitating access 
to health care in prisons and promoting 
alternative non-custodial sentencing 
mechanisms for minor non-violent drug-
related offences. It also advocates for bal-
ance and proportionality in drug demand 
and supply policies, as well as for a public 
health and human rights perspective in 
addition to a criminal justice approach. In 
view of the otherwise fairly tough stance 
adopted by some governments represented 
at the Accra workshop, the core elements 
of this position are surprisingly progressive. 
Although it does not signal a radical change 
of drug policy course, it is a breath of fresh 
air in the region’s reform debate. What’s 
more, many of the policy approaches now 
being officially promoted in countries such 
as Ghana are broadly compatible with the 
European Union’s position for UNGASS 
2016, offering new starting points for co-
operation. Nonetheless, there are still 
major obstacles to a reform of drug policy 
in West Africa. 
Continuity in criminal justice and 
border security in West Africa 
Although there is a new dynamic, no co-
herent trend can be identified within the 
region. The current shifts in position are 
mainly rhetorical, while in reality, there is 
a continued focus on repression. Even laws 
adopted fairly recently, such as the Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act in Liberia, 
criminalize drug use and introduce stiff 
penalties for drug dealing, with little dif-
ferentiation between the types of offences – 
contrary to the recommendations of the 
WACD and the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy. This reinforces the impression that 
the West African model is based on tough 
penalties for drug users and small-time 
dealers, in some cases coupled with aggres-
sive strategies against drug production, 
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similar to the approach adopted in the “war 
on drugs”. Considering the additional prob-
lems of corruption and patronage systems, 
this means that “the small fry is caught 
while the big fish swim free,” to quote Olu-
segun Obasanjo, the former President of 
Nigeria who currently chairs the West 
Africa Commission on Drugs (WACD). 
There is another aspect to be considered 
as well. The debate about a reform of drug 
policy in West Africa has so far focused on 
the demand side: in other words, on the 
individual countries’ response to drug use, 
and on national policy and law. But numer-
ous international initiatives have been 
launched to curb the smuggling of hard 
drugs through West Africa. In their attempts 
to disrupt supply and transit routes, exter-
nal actors mainly rely on stronger border 
controls and improved (trans-) regional 
cooperation. With the EU’s Cocaine Route 
Programme, for example, the European 
Commission is helping to build drug inter-
diction capacities at selected international 
airports in nine West African countries and 
improve national and international infor-
mation-sharing. These measures, which are 
being implemented by UNODC in collabo-
ration with Interpol and the World Cus-
toms Organization (WCO), also include 
joint activities such as COCAIR IV in 2013, 
a nine-day operation in which, according 
to Interpol, nearly 100 seizures were made 
at 30 international airports across Africa. 
UNODC and WCO have also launched a 
joint Global Container Control Programme 
at various ports, which involves the estab-
lishment of “joint multi-agency port con-
trol services” in countries including Benin, 
Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal and Togo. 
The West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), 
also co-funded by the EU and implemented 
by UNODC and others, aims to improve 
national and transnational coordination in 
the fight against organized crime by estab-
lishing Transnational Crime Units in five 
West African countries initially. 
Many EU member states and other 
donors are supporting capacity building 
measures and promoting regional coopera-
tion along land borders as well. For coun-
tries in Europe, it generally makes sense 
to curb drug flows close to the European 
markets, where the price effect is potentially 
greater than can be achieved through meas-
ures in the drug cultivation areas, for 
example. The success of these strategies is 
usually measured in terms of the number 
of arrests and the quantity of drugs seized. 
However, these metrics tell us very little 
about the impacts of the measures on the 
drug trade, largely because the seizure of 
some consignments and the arrest of cou-
riers or mules cannot be equated with the 
crushing of the criminal networks. More-
over, the smaller quantities of drugs being 
seized may simply reflect a change in traf-
fickers’ strategies or routes within or out-
side the region. Whether or not they 
achieve measurable successes, international 
efforts are likely to adhere to their present 
course for the foreseeable future, not only 
for the purpose of deterrence but also 
because measures to improve border secu-
rity and regional cooperation presumably 
dovetail with other interests, such as anti-
terrorism, in West Africa. Nonetheless, 
there are various starting points for a 
reform of drug policy. 
Time for new partnerships 
Although the Special Session of the UN 
General Assembly in New York did not 
result in any substantial changes in inter-
national drug policy, a more flexible 
approach to its implementation can be 
expected in the future. Despite the much-
discussed risk of fragmentation, there are 
also opportunities for new partnerships. 
The EU Action Plan on Drugs 2013–2016 
identifies West Africa as one priority 
region, and the more open debate in West 
Africa resulting from the UNGASS prepara-
tions has at least increased the overlaps 
with the EU position. In promoting more 
intensive cooperation, three priorities 
should be set. 
Firstly, what is needed is a more bal-
anced approach with a stronger focus on 
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public health, development, and respect for 
human rights, already emphasized in the 
March 2016 draft of the UNGASS outcome 
document. If these are not simply to remain 
paper commitments, pledges of funding are 
required to support the relevant actions. 
But while donors are quite willing to pro-
vide money for programmes in the security 
and justice sectors, it is far more difficult 
to mobilize funds for prevention and treat-
ment of drug abuse and its health implica-
tions. Here, the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), particularly “the prevention 
and treatment of substance abuse” (SDG 
3.5.), can generate additional momentum. 
Health programmes in particular should 
not be implemented separately from, but 
should be integral to, a national drug 
strategy, such as Nigeria’s National Drug 
Control Master Plan (2015–2019), which has 
been adopted with support from the EU. 
This at least envisages a balance between 
criminal justice and demand reduction 
through prevention and sensitization, treat-
ment and other health measures. 
Secondly, policy improvements should 
not only supplement but should also include 
criminal justice and security approaches. 
Until now, international efforts have largely 
bypassed – and in some cases have actually 
worsened – the core problems affecting 
criminal justice in West Africa. Capacity 
building may be important but addresses 
neither the criminalization of drug users 
or the disproportionate sentences more 
generally nor the problems associated with 
rampant protection economies and impun-
ity of kingpins. Western European coun-
tries have amassed considerable experience 
with decriminalization and alternatives to 
criminal justice. This should feature more 
prominently in the cooperation with West 
Africa, especially since some of the region’s 
countries are now more open to such ap-
proaches. At the very least, security and 
justice programmes should include ele-
ments which aim to achieve more trans-
parency and oversight within the system 
in order to minimize human rights abuses 
and other harm. Approaches of this type 
already exist to some extent, however, 
mainly on the margins of project activities. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that West Africa 
will gain little from the UNGASS process 
apart from an intermittently stronger focus 
on the health aspects of the drug problem 
and perhaps some alternative development 
programmes as the lowest common de-
nominator. That does not constitute a re-
form of drug policy. Measures such as those 
implemented under the Joint UNODC-WHO 
Programme on Drug Dependence Treat-
ment and Care may be a start, but without 
a genuinely integrated approach, they will 
not be sustainable in the long term. 
Thirdly, the militarization of drug policy 
in West Africa must be avoided. Some of the 
profits from the drug trade do in fact ben-
efit groups which are increasingly provid-
ing armed protection for drug trafficking in 
the Sahel-Sahara region. Nevertheless, any 
blurring of drug policy and the anti-terror 
agenda is likely to increase violence, espe-
cially since the security forces are competi-
tors in the protection economy in some 
cases. The creation of synergies between 
efforts to combat terrorism, organized 
crime and drug trafficking through better 
border security and more regional coopera-
tion – an approach whose benefits were 
reiterated by the UN Security Council when 
it extended the mandate for the UN mission 
in Mali in June 2015 – is by no means auto-
matic. A more sensible approach must surely 
be based on enhanced border management, 
aimed at increasing the presence of state 
actors but also involving nearby communi-
ties, as envisaged, for example, by the Bor-
der Management & Border Communities 
project initiated by the UN Development 
Programme for the Sahel G5 countries. 
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